SafePay's reported activity is not limited to encrypting files. The joint advisory describes data theft, threats to publish stolen information and, in some cases, direct phone contact with victims. This double-extortion model means a successful intrusion can create a confidentiality incident even when decryption is technically possible. Defenders need a response plan that treats exposure reduction, data access and leak monitoring as connected work.
The public footprint sets the first priority
The advisory says SafePay actors obtained access through credential exposure, brute-force attacks, VPN access and exploitation of internet-exposed systems. It names Cisco ASA/FTD, Veeam Backup & Replication and SonicWall SonicOS among the affected products. The organization's public footprint therefore helps identify which entry points could lead to data-bearing systems.
ZoomEye can provide a structured observation of internet-facing products and CVE references. On October 31, 2026, vul.cve="CVE-2024-40766" returned 93,209 all-asset observations, while app="SonicWall" returned 2,513,927. The query service="rdp" returned 16,549,923. These counts describe indexed technical patterns. They do not identify a victim or show that a particular asset contains sensitive data.
The correct use is to connect the observation to an internal asset record. Does the system belong to a business unit that handles regulated or personal data? Can the remote-access account reach file shares, databases or cloud storage? Is the system included in the data-retention map? A public service with no sensitive data path deserves attention, but a weak remote path into a data warehouse may deserve more.
Prepare for theft before encryption
Detection plans often focus on ransomware file extensions or encryption events. Data theft can occur earlier. Monitor for bulk reads, large transfers, archive creation, new cloud sync clients and access to backup catalogs. Establish a normal range for each data store so an alert can identify a meaningful change.
Separate egress paths for sensitive systems from ordinary internet access. Require approved destinations and log large transfers. If a data store can send data to an unknown cloud account, the control is incomplete. These measures do not prove that data was stolen, but they shorten the time between an unauthorized access and a containment decision.
Review account permissions against the data classification. An administrator who can read every file may be necessary for operations, but a service account does not need the same reach. Remove dormant identities, rotate shared secrets and make privileged access time bound. The advisory's identity and MFA recommendations apply to the people and workloads that can reach data, not just to the VPN login.
Build a leak-response evidence set
If data is published, the response team needs to identify what was taken and which systems were involved. Preserve logs, access records and file inventories before restoring or rebuilding. Compare the claimed data set with known records, but avoid confirming authenticity from a leak-site claim alone. Coordinate legal, communications and incident response before public statements.
Phone contact from the actor is another evidence event. Record the number, timestamp, message and any instructions, while following the organization's incident-response and law-enforcement guidance. Do not negotiate or send funds through an ad hoc process. The advisory describes the pressure tactic; it does not provide a safe playbook for every jurisdiction.
Turn exposure data into a data-path review
A practical review starts with the public service, follows the authentication path and ends at the data store. For each path, ask which credentials are accepted, which data can be read, how the activity is logged and who can stop it. Prioritize the paths that combine weak authentication, broad network reach and sensitive data.
SafePay's reported scale of at least 600 victims makes this exercise urgent for organizations with large public estates. The defensible conclusion is narrow: external observations can help order the work, while internal data mapping and log evidence determine the real business impact. A complete readiness plan covers both.